The timeliness of loan loss provisions and the credit crunch in Spain: Evidence from firm-level data by Martínez Zaragoza, Mónica
Bachelor’s Degree in Finance and Accounting  
Universitat Jaume I 2013-2014 
 
 
End of Degree Project 
 
The timeliness of loan loss provisions and the 
credit crunch in Spain: Evidence from firm-level 
data 
 
Author: Mónica Martínez Zaragoza 
Email address: al184963@alumail.uji.es 
 
Tutor: Manuel Illueca Muñoz 
 
June, 2014 
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allows us to match borrowers and lenders financial statements for the period 1997-
2009. Our findings suggest that a) financial entities with higher capital buffers before 
the crisis exhibit a lower reduction in its lending to non-financial firms during the crisis, 
b) commercial banks and saving banks with more timely loan loss recognition prior to 
the crisis exhibit a lower reduction in its lending to non-financial firms during the crisis, 
c) firms borrowing from banks with more timely loan loss recognition prior to the crisis 
exhibit a lower likelihood of bankruptcy during the crisis. 
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1. Introduction  
 
The credit crunch faced by the Spanish firms, particularly the small and medium 
sized companies, has been recurrently identified as one of the main failures of the 
Spanish economy within the current economic crisis. Compared to other European 
countries, Spanish firms bear higher interest rates and face tighter restrictions to fund 
new investment projects. Some voices indicate that the credit crunch in Spain is not so 
much a supply-driven but a demand-driven phenomenon, which will fade away as the 
country completes the overhaul of its entire production model from a non-competitive 
low-value-added economy into a productive economy based on knowledge. However, it 
cannot be ruled out that the imbalances of the Spanish banking system, accumulated 
during the expansion phase of the economic cycle, had a negative impact in the 
Spanish firms, at least in the early stage of the crisis, due to the reluctance of the local 
authorities to undertake the restructuring process of the banking industry.  
 
One of the aspects that could have negatively influenced the extension of bank 
loans during the crisis is the accounting policies implemented by the Spanish financial 
institutions before the economic crisis. Due to the apparent solvency of the borrowers 
during the boom, Banks and Saving Banks did not properly anticipate the risks 
associated with their lending activity. After the burst of the real estate bubble, many of 
these loans, especially those extended to the construction firms and land developers, 
became non-performing loans, leading Spanish banks to recognize additional loan loss 
provisions in their income statement. This circumstance had a negative impact in banks 
earnings, which were already decreasing because of declining margins and lower 
economic activity. Capital ratios worsened up to the limit of compromising the viability 
of some financial entities in the country, which were finally bailed out by the Fund for 
Orderly Banking Restructuring (FOBR). The vast majority of the Spanish financial 
institutions had to dramatically reduce the size of their balance sheets to restore their 
minimum regulatory capital, tightening the credit conditions to their clients.   
 
Many of these problems might have been mitigated, had the Spanish banks 
adopted more conservative accounting policies before the crisis. Indeed, academics 
and practitioners had pointed out that excessive delay in loan loss recognition might 
hinder the stability of the financial system (Laeven and Majnoni, 2002). In Spain, the 
threat of a rise in default rates in an eventual crisis scenario prompted the setup of the 
dynamic provisioning system in 2000, though its effects on bank behavior were limited 
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and not always coherent with the objectives that oriented its design (Illueca, Norden y 
Udell, 2014).  
 
In this context, the main objective of this End of Degree Project is to test 
whether more conservative banks before the economic crisis –i.e., those who exhibited 
timelier loan loss recognition-, were able to extend more loans to their borrowers after 
the burst of the real estate bubble in Spain. To do this, we use a unique database 
(SABI), which allows us to match borrowers and lenders financial statements for the 
period 1997-2009. Because of the very nature of the dataset, we can isolate the effects 
of banks’ accounting policies on firms’ bank debt from other supply and demand factors 
underlying the lending process.     
 
This End of Degree Project is related to the academic literature on conditional 
accounting conservatism and its effects on the real economy. Accounting research 
highlights that timely recognition of future losses decreases managers’ incentives to 
undertake negative NPV projects. Within the context of takeovers of quoted firms, 
Francis and Martin (2010) show that companies with a higher level of a conditional 
accounting conservatism exhibit higher post-acquisition performance. Bushman, 
Piotroski and Smith (2011) suggest that the effects of conditional accounting 
conservatism on firms’ investing behavior increase when firms face a restricted set of 
investment opportunities. Finally, Biddle, Ma and Song (2011) posit a negative 
relationship between conditional conservative accounting and the likelihood of 
bankruptcy for the US setting.  
 
As to the banking literature, this EDP draws from Beatty and Liao (2011), which 
provides empirical evidence compatible with the idea that the credit granted by 
American Banks during the financial crisis depends positively on its level of conditional 
accounting conservatism prior to the crisis.  Compared to this study, the contribution of 
this EDP is threefold.  First, the empirical evidence provided in this study is based on 
data from non-financial firms, previously identified as clients of commercial banks and 
savings Banks. Therefore, it is possible to investigate whether the amount of credit 
borrowed by non-financial firms during the crisis is related to the accounting policies 
implemented by the lenders prior to the crisis, controlling for aspects related to the 
supply side of the lending activity, and the specific characteristics of the borrower; i.e. 
ex ante credit risk, size, industry, growth and/or level of internationalization.  In other 
terms, it is possible to isolate the effect of banks’ accounting policies from other supply 
and demand factors underlying the lending process. Second, by focusing on the 
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borrowers and not so much on the lenders, it is possible to evaluate the effects of 
timely loan loss recognition by banks on non-financial firms financing strategies. In 
particular, we can evaluate whether borrowers from non-conservative lenders mitigate 
the negative shock in bank lending subsequent to the crisis by switching to other 
banks, by increasing the trade credit or simply by raising common equity. We look at 
these combined effects by estimating a standard bankruptcy model for borrowers in 
which loss recognition delays (of lenders) is included as an explanatory variable along 
with other variables typically considered in the literature.  And third, the Spanish setting 
makes this project especially interesting. On the one hand, this EDP is based on one of 
the most profound banking crisis in the world after the Lehman Brothers´ debacle. And 
on the other hand, this EDP takes advantage of the distinctive characteristics of the 
Spanish banking industry. Before 2012, our banking system was composed of 
commercial banks with a traditional corporate government structure, and savings 
Banks, which are nonprofit organizations and exhibit a high degree of control by 
Regional and Local Governments. Because saving banks had fewer incentives than 
commercial banks to undertake an early recognition of loan losses, the Spanish setting 
provides a unique opportunity to test the effects of conditional accounting conservatism 
of banks on the real economy.   
 
By the way of summary, our results confirm that a) financial entities with higher 
capital buffers before the crisis exhibit a lower reduction in its lending to non-financial 
firms during the crisis, b) commercial banks and saving banks with more timely loan 
loss recognition prior to the crisis exhibit a lower reduction in its lending to non-financial 
firms during the crisis, c) firms borrowing from banks with more timely loan loss 
recognition prior to the crisis exhibit a lower likelihood of bankruptcy during the crisis.  
 
Hereafter, this EDP is organized as follows. The following section presents the 
fundamental characteristics of the Spanish banking system and describes the 
accounting standards on loan loss provisioning in Spain.  The third section sets forth 
the main hypotheses to be tested in this project.  The fourth section describes the 
research design, especially focusing on the sample, the proxy for the timeliness in loan 
loss recognition, and the econometric models used to test our main hypotheses. 
Sections 5 and 6 discuss the main findings of this paper, and the seventh section 
concludes.   
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2. Institutional Background. 
 
 
a) The Spanish banking system: Commercial Banks versus Saving Banks 
  The Directive 2000/12/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 
March 2000, relating to the taking up and pursuit of the business of credit institutions, 
states that “a credit institution shall mean an undertaking whose business is to receive 
deposits or other repayable funds from the public and to grant credits for its own 
account”. Accordingly, three types of banks coexisted in Spain from 1997 to 2009 -the 
time horizon of this paper-; namely, Commercial Banks, Saving Banks and Credit 
Cooperatives. 
From the banking business perspective, there are no significant differences 
between the aforementioned types of financial institutions because, as the directive 
itself states the three of them “have reserved by law, exclusive and exclusionary, the 
funds acquisition activity, besides the core business of lending to others." In this end-
of-degree-project we will focus on commercial banks and savings banks. We will 
exclude credit cooperatives since their market share in the Spanish banking sector was 
-and still is- marginal, only 5% of total loans and deposits in 2007, and accordingly the 
number of borrowers from these institutions in our database is rather low. 
The main differences between savings banks and commercial banks rely on their 
ownership structure and governance model, which respond to different approaches on 
the nature and objectives of the banking business. Savings banks are non-for-profit 
organizations with no formal owners, which pursue a wide array of goals: providing 
social services to the community, contributing to regional development, enhancing 
competition among firms in the banking industry, and preventing the exclusion of 
popular classes from the financial system, particularly of those belonging to 
geographically isolated and economically depressed areas. Because there are no 
formal owners and no tradable shares, savings banks were not subject to market for 
corporate control, so that inefficient managers were not threatened by hostile 
takeovers, as opposed to those of commercial banks (Crespi, García-Cestona y Salas, 
2006). Indeed, from 1990 to 2008 different savings banks took control of small and 
medium sized regional banks, such as Banco de Valencia, and Banco de Murcia, 
among others. After the deregulation of the Spanish banking industry in the late 80s, 
which consisted mainly of lifting compulsory lending coefficients and removing 
branching barriers, the Spanish Savings Banks undertook an ambitious expansion 
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process throughout the Spanish geography that significantly increased its network of 
branches and increased its market share to overcome that of commercial banks at the 
dawn of the economic crisis. Due to its unique ownership structure, savings banks 
could not raise external equity capital, so that their equity consisted mainly of retained 
earnings. Indeed, according to law, saving banks had to allocate at least 50% of their 
profits to reserves reserving the rest of profits to fund social projects in the territorial 
scope of these entities. 
After the collapse of the sector in the early 10's, various international 
organizations, the business press and other financial experts have criticized the high 
degree of politicization of these institutions in the years of growth previous to crash of 
the estate bubble. In practice, the Spanish regional governments exerted a thorough 
control of many of these entities affecting various aspects of management. Garicano 
and Cuñat (2010) indicate that the level of training of executives designated by 
politicians was not suitable for the performance of their duties. Illueca, Norden and 
Udell (2013) suggest that the politicization of saving banks increased the risk taken in 
areas of expansion. And finally, Illueca and Lavezzolo (2014) document an artificial 
increase in loans granted by savings banks before regional elections. 
Both the politicization of management and the restrictions on access to finance, 
which result from their unconventional institutional architecture, introduced serious 
problems when the Spanish authorities had to clean up the banking sector after the 
burst of the real estate bubble. Because of the supervisor’s request of raising their 
capital ratios, saving banks were forced to issue financial instruments computable as 
additional Capital: subordinated debt, preferred stocks and non – voting equity units. 
  The differences in the legal nature of the Spanish savings banks and 
commercial banks grant an added interest to this final project, since we expect different 
incentives between the two types of entities in relation to the early recognition of 
impairment losses. A priori, the savings banks, which are more dependent on self-
financing for the completion of their expansion strategies, had fewer incentives than 
commercial banks to develop a more conservative accounting policy.  Timely loan loss 
provisions would have reduced the benefit and limited expansion possibilities. In this 
regard, in the next section we summarize the basic elements of the recognition of 
impairment losses, according to the Spanish legislation. 
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b) Spanish accounting standards on loan loss provisions 
 
In accordance with the accounting principle of prudence, the Bank of Spain 
states that financial institutions shall put effort into the rigorous and individualized study 
of the credit risk of their borrowers, not only at the time of granting credits but also 
during the entire time horizon of the loan, and importantly they shall not delay the 
recognition of non-performing loans and the corresponding loan loss provisions as 
soon as the existence of an abnormal credit risk is observed. 
Accordingly, deposit institutions must consider as nonperforming assets the 
loans, debt securities and other debit balances, whatever the guarantee or collateral 
assets, when reimbursement is problematic for reasons other than sovereign risk. 
Within this definition of nonperforming assets it is worth explaining that there are two 
reasons to classify an instrument as nonperforming assets: 
 
• Past due nonperforming assets, when payments of interest and principal are past 
due by 90 days or more.  
• Other nonperforming assets; i.e., payments are not past due by 90 days or more, 
but there is a significant decline in borrower’s creditworthiness. 
Financial institutions shall classify a loan as nonperforming if payments of 
interests and principal are past due and three months have elapsed since the first 
request of payment made by the entity. Because loss given default is increasing with 
the amount of time past due, the Bank of Spain imposes increasing minimum coverage 
rates from 25% for the first 6 months to 100% after 24 months. These amounts might 
vary according to the type of required collateral and the nature of the borrower.  
Regardless of the amount of time past due, financial institutions shall classify a 
loan as nonperforming if there is a significant deterioration in borrower’s 
creditworthiness, according to its main financial indicators, such as recurrent losses, 
generalized late payments, negative equity or inadequate capital structure. In this 
context it shall classify as nonperforming loans those involved in a court dispute, and 
those extended to firms that filled for bankruptcy. These non-performing loans will be 
provisioned by an amount equal to the estimated irrecoverable amounts, according to 
internal criteria of financial institutions based on maximum prudence. 
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The recognized provisions to cover losses from nonperforming loans are 
referred to as specific provisions. Until 2005, specific provisions coexisted with the so-
called general provisions, equivalent to 1% of bank loans, which had to be recognized 
by banks in order to cover any deterioration in the value of assets not associated with a 
triggering event, such as payments past due for example. 
In the second half of 2000, the Bank of Spain introduced a new provisioning 
system, called dynamic provisioning system, which was designed to complete the 
insolvency fund accumulated by Spanish credit institutions during the expansionary 
phase of the economic cycle. At that time, Spain was growing at a strong pace and the 
default rate was the lowest of all OECD countries. To avoid the consequences of a rise 
in defaults during future crises, the Bank of Spain obliged banks to recognize in their 
income statements the potential losses that could arise in case of a worsening in the 
general economic conditions. They had, basically, to constitute a reserve in good years 
that would be used in bad years to mitigate the losses of banks, preserving their capital 
and avoiding excessive credit contraction. 
The Bank of Spain gave precise rules to calculate such potential losses, based 
on the deterioration observed during the last economic crisis experienced by the 
Spanish economy. The new provisions were added to the general and specific 
provisions, to reach the level required by the supervisor. These rules of calculation 
would be revised slightly in 2005 to conform to international accounting standards.  
From this year, the anticyclical provision is included in the general provision, reducing 
to two categories the loan loss provisions recognized by the Spanish banks: specific 
and generic loan loss provisions. 
  In any case, for the purposes of this final project, it should be highlighted that 
the Bank of Spain established minimum amounts for both the specific and the general 
provision, allowing credit institutions choose higher levels of unconditional and 
conditional conservatism, depending on the nature of its loan portfolio and corporate 
strategy. 
Precisely, as more conservative banks accrue provision buffers before the 
crisis, we expect the equity capital ratio to be less relevant during the crisis for these 
banks than for the less conservative entities. By recording greater provisions, banks 
can keep the loan supply even when the capital ratio decreases in relation to the levels 
prior to the crisis.  
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3. Hypothesis development  
 
 
H1. Financial institutions with greater capital buffers before the crisis reduce 
less their credit supply to non-financial firms during the crisis. 
  
This first hypothesis is directly related to the theory of Credit Crunch. The Credit 
Crunch theory suggests that lending is particularly sensitive to regulatory capital 
constraints during recessionary periods, when regulatory capital declines and external-
financing frictions increase (Beatty and Liao, 2011). 
 
The Spanish banking regulation is subject to international criteria promulgated 
by Basel Committee on Banking Regulations and Supervisory Practice. According to 
these regulations, all Spanish financial institutions are subject to the conservation of a 
minimum ratio of capital to assets of 6% of the value of the total assets (Bank of Spain 
Circular 2/2014). These capital buffers are imposed by banking regulations to 
strengthen the stability of the global banking system as well as harmonize international 
regulation (Chouldhry, 2012). 
 
During expansionary periods, the Spanish economy had a high activity rate, 
coupled with a low level of non-performing loans, so that provisions to cover future 
expected-losses decrease dramatically and providing banks with a strong incentive to 
extend new loans to non-financial firms. With the change in the economic cycle, 
Spanish financial institutions’ activity experienced a significant decline and a sharp 
increase in non-performing loans takes place. 
 
This fact had two important consequences: a) the collapse of the banking 
activity dramatically reduced the banks´ income, and b) the increase in non-performing 
loans motivated by the financial turmoil obliged financial institutions to recognize 
additional provisions to cover expected future-losses. Both developments implied an 
increase in banks´ losses, thereby eroding the benefit of the entity. 
 
The decrease of banks´ benefits during recessionary periods and the resulting 
drop of the capital buffers led to decrease on the banks´ willingness to lend in order to 
avoid potential future violation of regulatory capital ratios. The banks, whose capital 
buffers were enough large to absorb the decrease of banks´ earnings, are expected to 
reduce less their credit supply to non-financial companies during economic slowdowns.   
9 
 
H2. More conservative banks prior to the crisis restrict less their credit volume to 
their borrowers during the recessionary periods than less conservative banks.  
 
More conservative banks recognize timelier loan loss provision to riskier 
borrowers. This raises two advantages. The first one is that by recognizing an expense 
before the occurrence of the loss, the bank is creating hidden reserves in the balance 
sheet which serve as the aforementioned capital buffers. From this perspective, this 
second hypothesis would just be an extension of the first one: banks with more hidden 
reserves in the balance sheet could absorb higher loan loss provision during the crisis, 
as indeed those financial institutions which have large capital buffers do. 
 
The second advantage is that by recognizing loan loss provisions in advance, 
financial institutions have fewer incentives to lend to risky borrowers (Illueca, Norden y 
Udell, 2014). In fact, recent literature suggests that more conservative non-financial 
firms: a) have higher returns after mergers (Francis et all, 2009) and b) have a lower 
likelihood of filing for bankruptcy (Biddle et all, 2011).  Because more conservative 
banks have more incentives to lend to solvent borrowers, one might expect that after a 
significant deterioration in general economic conditions, these banks suffer lower 
losses than those who delayed the recognition of loan loss provisions in the 
expansionary periods. 
 
 Therefore, we expect that more conservative banks prior to the crisis restrict 
less their credit supply to non-financial firm during economic slowdowns. 
 
 H3. Conditional accounting conservative policies adopted prior to the crisis 
reduce non-financial firms´ likelihood of filing bankruptcy during the 
recessionary periods. 
 
 Lending constraints to non-financial firms may result in suboptimal capital 
expenditures, abnormally low inventories or insufficient amounts of credit to clients. To 
mitigate the effects of credit restrictions, non-financial firms could switch to alternative 
finance sources, basically equity capital or trade credit from suppliers. During economic 
slowdowns, characterized by high asymmetric information, it is difficult to raise external 
equity capital, especially for the non-listed companies which account for the vast 
majority of the firms in Spain. Moreover, the increase in credit from suppliers depends 
on sales growth, which is usually low under weak economic conditions. Hence, 
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constrained firms find it difficult to increase trade credit, even if suppliers are willing to 
extend the number of collection days.  
 
Therefore, we expect that when facing an external shock in bank lending, firms 
cannot fully counteract the decrease in bank loans by switching to other financial 
institutions or turning to alternative financing sources, therefore endangering firm 
survival and growth. In short, we assume that borrowers of less conservative banks 
before the crisis will have a greater likelihood of filing for bankruptcy during the crisis 
than those operating with more conservative banks. Certainly, this hypothesis might be 
considered as a corollary of hypothesis 2. However, the empirical analysis carried to 
test hypothesis 3 is in itself a test on the economic relevance - and not just the 
statistical significance – of the effect of lender's accounting policy on the borrower’s 
access to finance. 
 
 
4. Research Design 
 
a) Sample 
 
To test the hypothesis put forward in this project, two interconnected databases 
have been used. The first one refers to non-financial Spanish firms, whereas the 
second one gathers information on their lenders, the Spanish banks.  
 
The first source of information is the SABI database, which is commercialised in 
Spain by INFORMA. SABI contains the annual accounts submitted by firms to the 
Business Registers, along with general data such as location, incorporation date, 
managers, activity, auditor, and interestingly, the banks and saving banks they borrow 
from. Our dataset includes audited firms which meet the current regulations in terms of 
size, so as to guarantee a minimum of accuracy in the information used to test our 
three hypotheses. Moreover non-for-profit and non-market oriented firms were 
excluded from the database, because of their particular characteristics. 
 
The information used in this project refers to more than 30.000 Spanish firms 
(most of them non-listed companies) for the period 1997-2009. All variables are 
winsorized at the 1% / 99% percentile. Panel A Table1 shows summary statistics of 
the Spanish non-financial firms considered in this study. Our firms are profitable, with 
median ROA of 4.08% and median Roe of 11.64%. In addition, firms are solvent as the 
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median firm has a ratio of equity to total assets of 37.31%. Finally, the mean Altman 
(1968) Z-score, ex ante measure of default risk, is 2.74. 
 
 
(Insert here Table 1) 
 
 
As previously mentioned, the SABI database provides the actual name of the 
banks that lend to each firm. After a long process of codification, it is possible to build a 
matched lender-borrower database, which allows us to evaluate the effects of lender’s 
accounting policies on borrowers’ access to finance. Bankscope provides financial 
records and general information about international financial institutions. In order to 
carry out this research, we use the financial statements of the financial institutions with 
at least 500 borrowers in the SABI database for the period 1997-2009. A total amount 
of 51 banks and saving banks are considered in this study. Generally, a single firm 
borrows from more than one commercial bank at a time. More specifically, the average 
number of bank relationships per borrower and year amounts to 2 or 3. Consequently, 
the sample observation unit used in this project is the combination of firm-bank-year. 
 
Panel B of Table 1 reports summary statistics of key bank variables. The mean 
bank exhibits a ratio of total loans on total assets of 65.91%.The mean bank has a 
ROE of 11.88% and mean of equity on total assets is 6.815%. The mean ratio of loan 
loss provisions over total loans is 0.446% and the mean ratio of nonperforming loans 
divided by total loans is 1.264%. Finally, the median bank exhibits a ratio of deposits to 
total loans of 67.66%, which implies that Spanish banks largely use deposits as main 
financing instruments.  
After describing our database, the next sections of this paper are devoted to our 
empirical testing strategy, which consists of two parts: a) the estimation of the degree 
of conditional accounting conservatism of banks before the crisis, and b) the estimation 
of the effect of conditional accounting conservatism on credit availability for Spanish 
companies during the crisis. 
 
b) Conditional accounting conservatism in the Spanish banking industry 
 
Estimating the conditional accounting conservatism is a core aspect of this 
research. A general interpretation of accounting conservatism is articulated by the 
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International Accounting Standard Board (IASB), which states that conservatism is "a 
degree of caution in the exercise of the judgment needed in making the estimates 
required under conditions of uncertainty such that assets or revenues are not 
overstated and liabilities or expenses are not understated”. 
 
Although there is no unified definition of conservatism, we refer to it as ‘the 
anticipated recognition of loan loss provision’. As it has been previously mentioned, in 
2000 the Bank of Spain obliged the deposit institutions to recognise a dynamic 
provision to cover future potential losses that might arise in the recessive phase of the 
economic cycle. The supervisor determined the minimum amount of loan loss 
provisions to be recognized in the income statement, according to a formula based on 
the quarterly earnings for each entity. Hence, the level of conditional accounting 
conservatism of Spanish banks was not homogeneous along the period analysed in 
this EDP. In contrast it was quite heterogeneous, varying across financial institutions 
according to the institutional characteristics of two main components of the banking 
industry: savings banks and commercial banks.  
 
In this study, we estimate the level of conditional accounting conservatism of 
Spanish banks by using the approach suggested by Nichols et al. (2009). Basically, 
these authors regress loan loss provisions on two different sets of independent 
variables: a) the increase in non-performing loans in the previous two quarters and b) 
the increase in non-performing loans in the previous two quarters, the current quarter 
and the subsequent quarter. If loan loss provisions depend mainly on the past 
increases in non-performing loans, the accounting policy of the bank is considered as 
backward looking and less conservative. In contrast, if loan loss provision is driven 
mainly by current and future increases in non-performing loans, the bank is considered 
as more forward-looking and conservative. 
 
As previously stated, non-performing loans have an impact on loan loss 
provisions during at least 24 months from the occurrence of the triggering event. 
Hence, we adapt the Nichols et al’ s model to consider growth in 36 successive months 
as determinants of the impairment losses reported in the quarterly Income Statement. 
More specifically, we consider as current increases in non-performing loans ( NPLt) 
those that arise in past 12 months (in terms of quarters t-3 to t); past increases in non-
performing loans ( NPLt-1) are those recorded from quarter t-7 to quarter t-4; and future 
increases in non-performing loans ( NPLt+1) are those reported from quarter t+1 to 
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quarter t+4. Based on these on these definitions, we run the following system of 
equations for each bank with at least 10 consecutive available observations:  
 
LLP t = α0 +α1 NPL t-1 +  .        [I] 
            LLP t = α0 +α1 NPL t-1 + α2 NPL t + α3 NPL t+1 +  .    [II] 
 
Where  
LLP t denotes loan loss provision in quarter t divided by lagged total loans.  NPLt-1, 
 NPL t y  NPLt+1
 refer to past, current and future changes in nonperforming loans 
divided by lagged total loans.  
 
After estimating both equations for each bank, we obtain the specific conditional 
accounting conservatism measure by computing the difference of the adjusted R2 for 
both regressions. The higher the adjusted R2 of model [II] compared to model [II], the 
higher the delay in loan loss recognition by the bank. Following Beatty and Liao (2011), 
we define the dichotomous variable CAC which takes a value one if the difference of 
adjusted R2 is higher than the median of the sample and zero otherwise. We will use 
the variable CAC thereafter to empirically test the hypotheses put forward in this 
research. 
 
Table 2 reports regression results for the period 1997 - 2007. We find that 
second regression model has a higher adjusted R2, which implies that the median 
Spanish bank recognized present provisions based on past, current and, especially, 
future nonperforming loans. The median of adjusted R2 for our sample is 7.45% (mean 
is 12.43% and standard deviation in 19.48%). Our sample is composed for 51 Spanish 
banks and we classified 25 conservative banks and 26 non conservative banks. 
(Insert here Table 2) 
 
c) Capital buffers, conditional conservatism and bank lending during the 
crisis 
 
In order to test the hypothesis set out in this research project, we use a 
differences in difference approach. Our estimation strategy is to observe the reaction to 
the crisis exhibited by the target banks (i.e., banks with higher capital ratios or lower 
delay in loan loss recognition) vis-à-vis the control group. Our model incorporate a set 
of variables aimed at controlling for firm, bank, and firm-bank specific characteristics.  
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c.1) Credit crunch hypothesis: Baseline Model 
 
We start our research project by replicating Beatty and Liao (2011). Our 
objective is to evaluate the effect of regulatory capital ratio of the Spanish banks on the 
borrowers’ access to credit, both before and after the crisis. Unlike Beatty and Liao 
(2011), our analysis is based on micro-data at the firm level, rather than aggregated 
data at the bank level. Particularly, we run the annual increase in bank debt of non-
financial firms in year t on the capital ratio in year t-1 of the banks they operate with, 
and a set of control variables referred to firm specific, bank specific and bank-firm 
specific characteristics. In order to assess the differential effect of the economic crisis 
on the relationship between regulatory capital ratio and the increase of credit to non-
financial firms, we introduce a dummy variable which is activated from 2007, and the 
interaction of this variable with the regulatory capital of bank lenders. The estimated 
standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity and bank-firm clustering effects. 
 
  Loanijt = β0 + β1 Z-scoreit-1   + β2 Relationsit-1 + β3 Recessiont + β4 Capitaljt-1 + β5 
Capitaljt-1 * Recessiont + β6Bank_Sizejt + β7 Bank_Deptajt + Φij +     . 
 
Where j and i refers to lenders and borrowers respectively, and 
  
  Loan:   Annual increase in loans divided by total assets. 
Z-score:   Altman Z-score for non-listed firms. 
Relations: Number of bank Relationships at the beginning of the 
year. 
Recession: An indicator variable equal to one for subsequent periods 
to 2007, and zero otherwise. 
Capital :   Capital Ratio at the beginning of the year, divided by 100. 
Bank_Size:   Natural log of lagged total assets. 
Bank_Depta:   Lagged total deposits divided by total loans. 
Bank- Firm Fixed Effects: Fixed effects for each bank-firm combination, which aim 
to control unobservable, constant and specific aspects. 
 
The main variable in this prediction is Capital x Recession. We predict a positive 
coefficient for this variable, since the capital buffers created by the banks have a more 
relevant impact during the crisis as opposed to expansion periods; that is, the 
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regulatory capital ratio of the financial entities will be a key indicator in the increase of 
loans during the recessionary periods. 
 
We add two control variables, following the model of Beatty and Liao (2011). 
We include Bank_Depta to capture access to deposit financing. Financial institutions 
which base their financing model on collecting deposits are considered as more averse 
to risk, consequently, they will tend to reduce the credit volume to a greater extent. We 
predict a negative coefficient on this control variable. We account for entity size by 
means of Bank_Size. In accordance with the study mentioned above, we include this 
variable so as to control technical aspects of the entity. 
 
The reach and depth of our database allows us to complete the model with 
control variables at specific to firms. More specifically, we add to regression the 
variable Z-score, a widely accepted indicator of the non-financial firms´ filing 
bankruptcy ex ante. We predict a positive coefficient on Z-Score, taking into account 
that the higher the Z-score, the lesser the risk for the financial entity, therefore higher 
credit access for the company. We also incorporate the number of bank – firms´ 
relationships to the basic econometric model. However, we do not predict the sign of 
the coefficient on this variable. 
 
Following Kysucky and Norden (2013), firms which keep a financial model 
based on exclusive relational banking tend to register a higher volume of credit. 
However, several studies such as von Thaden (2004), suggest that companies which 
have fewer banking relationships suffer credit access restrictions in the medium-term, 
because the banks enjoy a monopoly position over the essential financial information of 
the firm. The coefficient sign which links the increment of credit to the number of 
banking relationships is, after all an empirical question, which will be elucidated along 
this work for the Spanish case. 
 
Along with the control variables previously mentioned, our baseline regression 
model includes fixed effects for each bank-firm combination, aimed at controlling for 
time-invariant non-observable characteristics of a) banks, b) firms and c) lender-
borrower relationship, such as the structure of the property of the firm (as long as it 
remains constant for the whole estimation window), institutional features of the deposit 
institutions (whether the lender is a commercial bank or a saving bank) or the physical 
distance between the lender and the borrower. 
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In addition, we split the sample into two sub-samples: companies that borrow 
from commercial banks and saving banks, respectively. We predict that the impact of 
the variable Capital x Recession on the borrower’s access to credit will be higher for 
saving banks, since these financial institutions have greater difficulties to issue external 
equity capital in case of violations of the regulatory capital ratio. 
 
 
 
c.2) Delay in loan loss recognition by lenders and borrowers’ increase in bank 
loans 
 
After evaluating the differential impact of banks’ regulatory capital ratio on 
borrowers’ access to credit during the crisis, our second hypothesis focuses on the 
relationship between the delay of loan loss recognition by banks before the crisis and 
the borrowers’ increase in bank debt during the crisis. To that end, we extend the 
baseline regression model in the following way: 
 
  Loan ijt = β0 + β1 Z-score ijt-1 + β2 Relations it-1 + β3 Recession t + β4 Capital jt-1 +   
β5 Capital jt-1 * Recession t + β6 CACj x Capital jt-1 + β7 CACj x Recessiont + β8 CACj x 
Capital jt-1 x Recession t + β9 Bank_Size jt + β10 Bank_Depta jt + Φij +   . 
 
Where j and i refers to lenders and borrowers respectively, and 
 
  Loan: Annual increase in bank loans divided by total assets. 
Z-score:  Altman Z-score for non-listed firms. 
Relations: Number of bank Relationships.   
Recession:  An indicator variable equal to one for subsequent periods to 2007, and 
zero otherwise.  
Capital: Capital Ratio  
CAC:  An indicator variable equal to one for conservative banks and zero 
otherwise.  Where the conservatism measure is the difference between 
adjusted R2 (II – I), from following two regression. The difference 
between adjusted R2 is greater than the median of the sample the non-
financial firm is conservative and non-conservative otherwise. 
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     Eq (I):  LLPt = α0. +α1 NPL t-1 +  . 
     Eq (II): LLP t = α0 +α1 NPL t-1 + α2 NPL t + α3 NPL t+1 +  .  
 
  Where: 
LLPt denotes loan loss provision in quarter t divided by lagged total loans.  NPLt-1
 
 NPLt y  NPLt+1
 refer to past, current and future changes in nonperforming loans 
divided by lagged total loans.  
 
Bank_Size: Natural log of lagged total assets.  
Bank_Depta: Lagged total deposits divided by total loans.   
Bank- Firm Fixed Effects: Fixed effects for each bank-firm combination, aimed at 
controlling for unobservable, time invariant specific characteristics of 
banks, firms and the borrower-lender relationship.  
 
 
Regarding the previous model, the second model incorporates three new variables:  
 
CAC x Capital  
CAC x Recession 
CAC x Capital x Recession 
 
Where CAC is a dummy variable which equals to one for conservative banks 
and zero otherwise. The time invariant variable CAC does not appear in the regression 
model since it is perfectly correlated with the bank-firm fixed effect. 
 
Our second hypothesis relative to the association between conditional 
accounting conservatism and credit access of Spanish non-financial firms is compatible 
with a positive sign for variable CAC x Recession and with a negative sign for the 
variable CAC x Capital x Recession. Basically, more conservative banks will have 
recognised   timelier loan loss provisions before the crisis, thus mitigating the decrease 
of both, profits and capital during the crisis. Obviously, as losses are diminished during 
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the crisis, the expected credit constraints to firms and families are smaller and 
therefore, the coefficient of the variable CAC x Recession is expected to be positive. 
 
 
c.3) Delay in loan loss recognition and the likelihood of bankruptcy 
 
After testing the effects of conditional accounting conservatism on credit access 
of non-financial firms, our third hypothesis states that higher delays in loan loss 
recognition by banks prior to the crisis leads have a positive impact in the likelihood 
that borrowers fill for bankruptcy during the crisis. Theoretically, this hypothesis could 
be interpreted as a corollary of our previous hypotheses, since tighter credit conditions 
hinder borrowers’ operating activities. However, non-financial firms could offset the 
decrease in bank debt using alternative sources of financing, such as trade credit or 
other shareholders contributions. Whether firms may substitute bank debt is ultimately 
an empirical question. In sum, the type of contribution implicit in this hypothesis is not 
qualitative or conceptual, it is rather quantitative: the question is whether the effect 
induced by the conditional accounting conservatism of banks before the crisis is 
relevant enough so as to increase the borrowers’ likelihood of bankruptcy during the 
crisis. In particular, we run the following logistic regression: 
 
Bankruptij = β0 + β1 Z-scorei + β2 Relationsi + β3 Constii + β4 Industryi + β5 Firm_Sizei                
+ β6 CACj + β7 CAC x Capital + β8 Capitalj + β9 Bank_Deptaj + β10 Bank_Loansj +   . 
 
 
Where j and i refers to lenders and borrowers respectively, and 
 
Bankrupt: An indicator variable equal to one if firm went bankrupt 
and zero otherwise. 
Z-Score:   Average Z-score for non-listed firms 
Relations:    Average bank relations. Bank Relations by firm. 
Consti:    Date of incorporation. 
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Firm_Size:    Average of the natural log of total assets. 
CAC: CAC is an indicator variable equal to one for conservative 
banks and zero otherwise. 
Capital:   Average Capital Ratio.  
Bank_Depta:   Average of total deposits divided by total loans. 
Bank_Loans:   Average of total loans divided by total assets.  
Industry:   Industry Dummies. 
 
 
Variable CAC is included in order to study the effect that conditional 
conservatism exerts on bankruptcy of non-financial firms. We predict that the 
coefficient of CAC will be negative, since more conservative banks will reduce credit to 
a lesser extent during the crisis, to the benefit of their borrowers. 
 
As previously mentioned, conditional accounting conservatism tends to play a 
substitute role of capital, thus we add the variable CAC x Capital. In this respect, we 
expect a positive coefficient for this variable, showing that conditional accounting 
conservatism tends to compensate the adverse effect of the lack of regulatory capital 
over the non-financial firms´ likelihood of bankruptcy during the crisis.  
 
Furthermore, we add industry fixed effects and three control variables related to 
firm characteristics: date of incorporation, size and Z-score. We predict a positive 
coefficient for the first variable, because older companies are less likely to fill for 
bankruptcy as opposed to new setup companies. Regarding the second variable -firm 
size-, we predict a negative coefficient. Finally, we expect a negative sign for the 
coefficient associated to the Z-score. 
 
At the bank level, we control for bank capital ratio, bank size and the ratio of 
deposits to total assets. We do not predict a sign for these control variables. As 
previously mentioned, we split the sample into firms borrowing from commercial banks 
and savings banks. Then we evaluate the effect of delayed loan loss recognition on the 
likelihood of bankruptcy in both subsamples. 
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5. Results and Discussion 
 
a) First Hypothesis: Banks´s Capital Ratio and the Spanish Credit Crunch   
To test the Credit Crunch hypothesis we run our base line model, which is 
explained in the section 4.b.1). The empirical results are included in the Table 3. Our 
main objective is to evaluate the effect of capital buffers on banks´ willingness to lend 
to non-financial firms, before and after the burst of the construction bubble in Spain. 
The dependent variable is the increase in borrower’s bank debt, deflated by lagged 
total assets. As independent variables, we consider lender’s capital ratio and a set of 
control variables aimed at capturing firm specific, bank specific and firm-bank specific 
effects. 
To evaluate the differential effect of the economic crisis, we have included a 
dummy variable, RECESSION, which equals to one for periods after 2007 and zero 
otherwise, and the interaction between this dummy variable and the lender’s capital 
ratio, RECESSION x CAPITAL. This interaction is the essential variable in this first 
regression model, since it allows us to estimate the differential effects exerted by the 
capital ratio in banks´ willingness to lend during the crisis as opposed to previous 
years.  
(Insert here Table 3) 
Consistent with our prediction, we find that the coefficient of RECESSION x 
CAPITAL is positive and statistically significant. This empirical result is consistent with 
our first hypothesis relative to the Credit Crunch theory, which states that the banks´ 
capital buffers set up before the crisis have played a prominent role during the Spanish 
crisis in mitigating the credit crunch. In contrast, capital buffers do not seem to play any 
significant role during the boom.  
As explained in section 4.c.1), our base line model includes two control 
variables, previously identified in the literature as main determinants of bank risk 
taking: bank size and total deposits divided by total assets.  According to our 
prediction, we find that the coefficient on Bank_Depta variable is negative and 
statistically significant. The sign of this coefficient suggests that financial institutions 
which based their financing model through taking deposits are more risk-averse. The 
coefficient of Bank_Size variable is positive and statistically significant. In addition, we 
consider two control variables relative to the financial characteristics of non-financial 
firms: Z-Score and Relations. Our findings are in line with expectations. The coefficient 
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of Z-Score is positive and statistically significant, suggesting that riskier borrowers face 
stronger restrictions in access to finance.  
A fundamental aspect to elucidate through this first regression model is the 
association between the number of bank - borrower´s relationship and bank lending. In 
line with Kysucky and Norden (2013), our findings confirm that long-lasting and 
exclusive bank - borrower relationships are associated with lower loan rates and higher 
credit volume. Contrary to our empirical evidence, Von Thadden (2004) suggests that 
firms with a single bank - borrower relationship may suffer restricted access to credit, 
because lenders tend to use proprietary and exclusive information on borrower’s to 
extract rents in the lending process.  
 
b) Second Hypothesis: Lenders’ delay in loan loss recognition and 
borrower’s access to credit  
The main objective of our second econometric model is to test the second 
hypothesis set forth in this EDP, whereby we predict that firms borrowing from more 
conservative banks prior to the crisis should be exposed to less credit´s constraints 
during economic slowdowns. To do this, we extend the Base Line Model, adding the 
interaction of the dummy variable, CAC, with our main explanatory variables 
RECESSION, CAPITAL and RECESSION x CAPITAL. As explained in section 4.b), 
CAC is a proxy for thee level of conditional accounting conservatism of banks prior to 
the crisis. Regression results are provided in the Table 4. 
(Insert here Table 4) 
The coefficients of the interactions CAC x RECESSION, CAC x CAPITAL, and 
CAC x CAPITAL x RECESSION are used to test the effect of conditional accounting 
conservatism policies adopted by the financial institutions prior to the Spanish crisis  on 
the banks´ willingness to lend to non-financial firms during the recessionary periods. 
The coefficient of CAC x Recession is positive and statistically significant 
consistent with the idea that more conservative banks prior to the crisis exhibit a lower 
decrease in bank capital ratios, which allow them to mitigate the impact of the crisis in 
its lending activity. Because more conservative banks accumulate additional reserve 
buffers before the crisis, we predict that the effect of capital buffers accumulated prior 
to the crisis is lower for these banks compared to less conservative banks. Less 
conservative banks rely more on capital to withstand lending restrictions.  
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Consistent with our second hypothesis, regression results show that the 
Spanish financial institutions, which are classified as more conservative prior to the 
crisis, restrict less their lending volume to their borrowers during the recessionary 
periods compared to less conservative banks. Accounting policies on loan loss 
provisioning have a significant impact on the banks´ willingness to lend to non-financial 
firms during economic slowdowns. In sum, conservative banks are less likely to worsen 
credit conditions, leading borrowers’ bank debt to suboptimal levels. This circumstance 
is attributable to two main factors, the high information asymmetries in the recession 
period and the systemic nature of the crisis, which made it difficult for borrowers to 
switch to other financial institutions.  
After evaluating the effect of conditional accounting conservatism on access to 
credit by non-financial firms, we focus on our third hypothesis which might be 
considered as corollary of the above hypotheses. Given that non-financial firms have 
difficulties to switch to other financial institutions, we predict that lending constraints 
imposed to non-financial firms could have a significant impact on borrowers’ likelihood 
of bankruptcy. To test this hypothesis, we run a bankruptcy model, which include as 
independent variables Capital, CAC and CAC x Capital, and a set of variables aimed at 
controlling for bank, firm and bank-firm specific characteristics.  
 
 c) Third Hypothesis: Lenders’ delay in loan loss recognition and 
borrower’s likelihood of bankruptcy 
  As previously explained, this third regression model allows us to evaluate, not 
only the statistically significance, but also the economic relevance of conditional 
accounting conservatism of banks from the perspective of their borrowers. In particular, 
we can assess whether the effect of the accounting conservatism policies induced by 
Spanish banks before the crisis significantly affects the borrower’s likelihood of 
bankruptcy. Regression results are provided in Table 5. 
(Insert here Table 5) 
  To test the third hypothesis we run a logistical regression model whose 
dependent variable BANKRUPT is a dummy variable, which equals to one if non-
financial firms´ filing bankruptcy during the crisis and zero otherwise. The model is 
estimated for all bank-firm combinations in the sample. For each of this bank - firm 
combination, independent variables are incorporated to the model as means computed 
for the period 1997-2009. 
23 
 
CAC and CAC x CAPITAL are used to test the effects of conditional accounting 
conservatism on bank borrowers´ filing bankruptcy.  As we predict in the section 4.c.3), 
the coefficient of CAC is negative and statically significance. This coefficient is 
consistent with our third hypothesis, which suggests that more conservative banks 
restrict less their credit supply during the recessionary periods, with favors the survival 
of non-financial firms. In line with prior expectations, the coefficient of CAC x CAPITAL 
is positive and statistically significant. This coefficient indicates that the conditional 
accounting conservatism tends to offset the Credit Crunch effects on non-financial 
firms´ filing bankruptcy during economic slowdowns.  
As to control variables, we find that the coefficient of Z-Score is negative and 
statistically significant. A large value for this ratio indicates a lower probability of non-
financial firms´ bankruptcy from ex ante perspective. Moreover, we find that the 
coefficient of Consti is positive and statistically significant,  which confirms that older  
firms are less likely to going bankrupt as opposed to startup firms. Finally, the 
coefficient of Firm_Size is negative and statistically significant, which suggests that 
smaller non-financial firms are more likely to filing bankruptcy.  
Regarding the number of bank relationships RELATIONS, Kysucky and Norden 
(2013) state that the amount of credit received by non-financial firms is decreasing with 
the number of bank relationships. Because firms with many bank relationships face 
tighter financing restrictions, we hypothesize that the likelihood of bankruptcy is 
positively correlated to the number of lenders. However, Carleti et al (2007) suggest 
that banks tend to share the supervision of the riskier borrowers, so that firms with a 
not exclusive bank - borrower relationship may be riskier. In sum, the relationship 
between the number of relationships and the likelihood of bankruptcy is ultimately an 
empirical issue. As shown in table 5, the coefficient of Relations is positive and 
statistically significant, which is consistent with the Kysucky and Norden’s prediction.  
 In sum, our findings suggest that the delays in loan loss recognition by banks 
prior to the crisis have a significant impact in non-financial firms´ likelihood of filing 
bankruptcy. This result is contrary to the idea that firms may completely offset the 
external shock in bank debt by switching to other funding sources. The empirical 
evidence provided in this paper suggests the existence of a statistically significant and 
economically relevant relationship between banks` accounting policies adopted before 
the economic crisis and credit access for non-financial firms during the financial crisis. 
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6. Additional analysis 
 As an additional analysis, we decided to split the sample into two subsamples: 
firms borrowing from commercial banks and saving banks. We expect significant 
differences in our empirical analysis, because of the institutional differences between 
both types of banks. 
Empirical results of our first regression model are provided in the Table 6. As 
explained in the previous section, the main objective of this first regression is to 
evaluate the effect of capital ratio on banks´ willingness to lend to non-financial firms. 
(Insert here Table 6) 
In the section 4.c.1) we argue that the effect of bank capital ratios on borrowers’ 
access to credit is expected to be higher for borrowers of saving banks, since these 
financial institutions face strong restrictions to raise external equity capital in the 
recessionary periods, as opposed to commercial banks that may issue ordinary shares. 
Consistent with that prediction, we find that the coefficient of Capital x Recession is 
positive and statistically significant only in the subsample of borrowers from saving 
banks. For the borrowers from commercial banks, the coefficient - thought positive - is 
not statistically significant. In short, our first regression model suggests that capital 
ratios have a positive significant impact in saving banks´ willingness to lend during the 
crisis, which does not extend to the commercial banks.  
Our second econometric model, which includes CAC as an independent 
variable, is aimed at evaluating the effect of the timeliness in loan loss recognition by 
banks on borrowers´ access to credit. The empirical results are provided on Table7.  
(Insert here Table 7) 
After the removal of branching barriers in the late nineties, savings banks 
engaged in a dramatic expansion across the Spanish regions. Because savings banks 
could not rely on equity capital to fund their expansion strategies, they had strong 
incentives to maximize retained earnings by delaying loan loss recognition. Hence, we 
expect saving banks to exhibit a homogeneous and rather low level of conditional 
accounting conservatism prior to the crisis. Consistent with that prediction, the 
coefficient of the variable CAC x Recession is not significant for the subsample of 
savings banks clients. In turn, this coefficient is positive and statistically significant for 
the firms borrowing from commercial banks, reflecting that commercial bank had a 
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heterogeneous and rather high level of accounting conservatism before the burst of the 
construction bubble.   
 Finally, we evaluate the effect of banks´ conditional accounting conservatism on 
borrowers´ likelihood of bankruptcy. The results of our logistic regression models, 
which are included in Table 8, are consistent with those reported in Table 7. The 
coefficient of variable CAC is negative and significant for the commercial banks 
subsample, suggesting that the higher the delay in loan loss recognition by commercial 
banks prior to the crisis, the lower the likelihood of bankruptcy for the borrowers during 
the crisis. However, we find no significant effects of the CAC variable in the savings 
banks subsample, consistent with the idea that savings banks exhibited a low and 
rather homogeneous level of conditional accounting conservatism prior to the crisis. 
Moreover, the coefficient of the interaction between CAC and Capital is negative 
statistically significant in the commercial banks subsample, suggesting that a higher 
degree of conditional accounting conservatism mitigate the effect of capital ratios on 
loan supply.  
(Insert here Table 8) 
 
7. Conclusions  
 
This End of Degree Project investigates the effects of banks´ accounting 
policies on the access to credit by non-financial firms during the crisis in Spain. To 
evaluate these effects, we use a sample data with matched lender-borrower financial 
statements, which allows us to test our main hypotheses on the basis of more than 
350.000 firm – bank – year observations.  
In particular, we test whether banks capital buffers have an impact in the 
increase in bank debt of non-financial firms before and after the burst of the 
construction bubble. The empirical evidence provided in this paper suggests that banks 
with large capital buffers withstand income declines generated by both the increase in 
non-performance loans and the decrease in economic activity. As a consequence, 
borrowers from these banks exhibit a lower reduction in bank loans. However, the 
impact of the regulatory capital ratio depends on the type of bank. Interestingly, the 
effect of capital buffers on borrowers’ access to credit is statistically significant only for 
savings banks. Commercial banks may raise external equity capital by issuing common 
shares, which mitigates the effects of prior capital ratios on its lending activity.  
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As to our second hypothesis, our findings suggest that conditional accounting 
policies have a significant impact on credit constrains to non-financial firms. More 
conservative banks reduce less their credit supply during recessionary periods than 
less conservative banks, because timelier loan loss provisioning generates hidden 
reserves in the balance sheet. Moreover, we find that the level of conditional 
accounting conservatism commercial banks is heterogeneous and high on average, 
whereas that of saving banks is homogeneous and low on average. Finally, we find 
that conditional accounting conservatism has a significant impact on borrower’s 
likelihood of bankruptcy.  
In sum, the empirical evidence provided in this paper suggests that there is a 
statistically significant and economically relevant relationship between banks` 
accounting policies adopted before the economic crisis and credit access for non-
financial firms during the financial crisis. 
 
 
 
 
  
27 
 
References 
 
Ahmed, A., Takeda, C., Thomas, S., 1999. Bank loan loss provision: A reexamination of 
capital management, earnings management and signaling effects. Journal of Accounting 
and Economic 28, 1-25. 
 
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 2011. Basel III: A global regulatory framework 
for more resilient Banks and banking system. Revised version June 2011. 
 
Basu, S., 1997. The conservatism principle and the asymmetric timeliness of earnings. 
Journal of Accounting and Economics 52, 1-20. 
 
Beatty A., and Liao, S., 2011. Do delays in loan loss recognition affects banks´ 
willingness to lend? Journal of Accounting and Economics 24, 3-37. 
 
Beave, W., Ryan, S., 2005. Conditional and Unconditional Conservatism: Concepts and 
Modeling. Review of Accounting Studies 10, 269-309. 
 
Biddle, G., Ma, M., Song, F., 2011. Accounting Conservatism and Bankruptcy Risk.  
Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1621272. 
 
Carletti, E., V. Cerasi and S. Daltung (2007). “Multiple-bank Lending: Diversification and  
Free-Riding in Monitoring, Journal of Financial Intermediation 16, 425-451. 
 
Choudhry, M., 2012. An introduction to Banking: Liquidity risk and assets –liability 
management. 
  
Crespí, R., García-Cestona, M., Salas, V., 2004. Governance mechanisms in Spanish 
banks. Does ownership matter? 24, 2311-2330. 
 
Cuñat, V., Garaciano, L., 2010.  Did Good Saving Banks Extend Bad Loans? 
Governance, Human Capital and Loan Portfolios, MPRA Paper 42434, University Library 
of Munich, Germany. 
 
Francis, J., Martin, X., 2010. Acquisition profitability and timely loss recognition. Journal 
of Accounting and Economics 49, 161-178. 
28 
 
 
Glase, M., Hirm, C., 2008. The Measure of Corporate Financial Constraints. Available at 
SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2338575. 
 
Illueca, M., Norden, L., Udell, G., 2014 . Liberalization and Risk-Taking: Evidence from 
Government-Controlled Banks. Review of Finance 18, pp. 17-57 
 
Illueca, M., Norden, L., Udell, G., 2013. “Conditional Accounting Conservatism and 
Bank Risk Taking,” AFA 2013 San Diego Meetings  
 
Kysucky, V., Norden, L., 2013. The Benefits of relationship lending in a cross-country 
context: A meta-analysis.  
 
Lavezollo, S. and M. Illueca, 2014:  Borrowing from Political Bankers. Evidence of 
Political Lending from Firm-Level Data. American Political Science Association 
Conference, Washington  
 
Leaven, L., Majnoni, G., 2003. Loan Loss provisioning and economic slowdown: too 
much, too late? Journal of Financial Intermediation 12, 178-197. 
 
Nichols, D., Wahlen, J., Wieland, M., 2009. Publicly traded versus privately-held: 
implications for bank profitability, growth risk, and accounting conservatism. Review of 
Accounting Studies 14, 88-122. 
 
Real Decreto Legislativo 1298/1986, de 28 de junio, sobre adaptación del derecho 
vigente en materia de Entidades de Crédito al de las Comunidades Europeas. 
Von Thadden, E., 2004. Asymmetric information, bank lending, and implicit contracts: the 
winner´s curse. Finance Research Letters 1,11-23. Available at SSRN: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2170601. 
29 
 
 
Table 1. Summary statistics 
 
Panel A: Firm Variables.  
 
This table reports the mean, median and standard deviation of key firm characteristics. All variables are winsorized at the 1% / 99% percentile. Data come from 33.122 firms 
during the period from 1997 to 2007 (541.541 firm – bank – year observations.  
 
Variable Description  Mean  Median  Standard Deviation  
     ROA  Return on assets (%) 4,08 3,27 11,22 
     ROE  Return on equity (%) 11,64 9,11 52,65 
     EQTA  Equity to total assets (%) 37,31 33,07 26,6 
     ZSCORE  Altman´s 1968 Z-Score (measure of ex ante risk) 2,74 2,59 1,41 
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Table 1. Summary statistics 
 
Panel B: Bank Variables.  
 
This table reports mean and median and standard derivation of key bank variables for 43 Spanish banks covering the period from 1997 to 2010. 
We not consider credit cooperatives since their market share in the Spanish banking sector is very small (less than 5% of total assets). 
 
Variable  Description    Mean  Median  Standard Deviation 
      ROA  Return on assets (%) 
 
0,832% 0,810% 0,37% 
      ROE  Return on equity (%) 
 
11,880% 11,650% 47,59% 
      EQTA  Equity to assets (%) 
 
6,815% 7,100% 1,79% 
      BANK LOANS Total loans on total assets (%) 
 
65,910% 67,660% 12,07% 
      BANK LOAN LOSS PROVISION  Loan Loss provision on total loans (%) 
 
0,446% 0,440% 0,24% 
      BANKS NONPERFORMING 
LOANS  Nonperforming loans on total loans (%) 
 
1,264% 0,979% 0,84% 
      BANK DEPTA  Deposits on total assets (%) 
 
67,666% 65,910% 14,24% 
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Table 2. Estimating the degree of timeliness in loan loss recognition for the Spanish banking industry  
This table reports the estimation results of two regression models of loan loss provisions on past, current and future increases in non-preforming loans. Data comes from 51 
banks and cover the period from 1997 – 2007. LLPt denotes loan loss provision in quarter t divided by lagged total loans.  NPLt-1
  NPLt y NPLt+1
 
refer to past, current and 
future changes in nonperforming loans divided by lagged total loans. The estimated standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity and bank-firm clustering effects. ***, ** and 
* denote statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
 
 
 
Dep. Var.:  Provisions 
        
 
Regression I 
 
Regression II 
        
 
Coefficient  T - Stat. Sig.  
 
Coefficient  T - Stat. Sig.  
        NPLt-1  0,0646 25,2181 *** 
 
0,0519603 19,7707 *** 
NPL t 
    
0,08015 17,92029 *** 
NPLt+1  
    
0,07219 19,9599 *** 
        Adjusted R2 0,08844    0,2088 
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TABLE 3: Banks´ Capital Ratios and the Spanish Credit Crunch 
This table reports estimation results of an OLS model for the increase in bank debt by borrowers. The 
main independent variables are the lenders’ capital ratios before and after the burst of the construction 
bubble. This regression model includes a set control variables at the bank, firm and bank-firm level. Data 
comes from 382.677 firm - bank - year combinations for the period 1997 - 2009. The estimated standard 
errors are robust to heteroskedasticity and bank-firm clustering effects. ***, ** and * denote statistical 
significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
 
Dep. Var.: ∆ Loan 
      Expected signs Coefficients p-value Sig. 
Z- Score (+) 0,0437 0,000 *** 
Relations 
 
-0,0025 0,000 *** 
Recession (-) -0,0396 0,000 *** 
Capital 
 
-0,048 0,021 ** 
Capital x Recession (+) 0,0908 0,110 ** 
Bank_Size 
 
0,0019 0,031 ** 
Bank_Depta (-) -0,0112 0,140 ** 
     BANK - FIRM Dummies YES 
Number of observations 382.677 
Adjusted R2 0,0518 
     
 Variable definition: 
  
  Loan:   Annual increase in loans divided by total assets. 
Z-score:   Altman Z-score for non-listed firms. 
Relations: Number of bank Relationships at the beginning of the 
year. 
Recession: An indicator variable equal to one for subsequent periods 
to 2007, and zero otherwise. 
Capital :   Capital Ratio at the beginning of the year, divided by 100. 
Bank_Size:   Natural log of lagged total assets. 
Bank_Depta:   Lagged total deposits divided by total loans. 
Bank- Firm Fixed Effects: Fixed effects for each bank-firm combination, which aim 
to control unobservable, constant and specific aspects. 
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TABLE 4. Delay of loan loss recognition by lenders before the crisis and increase 
in bank loans by borrowers during the crisis. 
This table reports regression results of an OLS model for the increase in borrowers’ bank debt during the 
crisis. The main independent variables are the delay of loan loss recognition by banks before the crisis, a 
dichotomous variable, Recession, that equals one if year>2007 and zero otherwise, and the interaction 
between both variables. In addition, this regression model includes a set of control variables at bank, firm 
and bank - firm level. Data comes from 342.687 firm - bank - year combinations for the period 1997 - 2009. 
The estimated standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity and bank-firm clustering effects. ***, ** and 
* denote statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
Dep. var.: ∆ Loan 
      Expected signs Coefficients p-value Sig. 
Z- Score (+) 0,04383 0,000 *** 
Relations 
 
-0,0025 0,000 *** 
Recession (-) -0,0531 0,000 *** 
Capital 
 
-0,1801 0,000 *** 
Capital x Recession (+) 0,3298 0,001 *** 
CAC x Capital 
 
0,1045 0,152 
 CAC x Recession (+) 0,1325 0,073 * 
CAC x Capital x Recession (-) - 0,2805 0,027 ** 
Bank_Size 
 
0,0013 0,171 
 Bank_Depta (-) -0,0965 0,082 * 
     BANK - FIRM Dummies YES
Number of observations 342.687 
Adjusted R2 0,0533 
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Variable Definitions 
  Loan: Annual increase in bank loans divided by total assets. 
Z-score:  Altman Z-score for non-listed firms. 
Relations: Number of bank Relationships.   
Recession:  An indicator variable equal to one for subsequent periods to 2007, 
andzero otherwise.  
Capital: Capital Ratio  
CAC:  An indicator variable equal to one for conservative banks and zero 
otherwise.  Where the conservatism measure is the difference between 
adjusted R2 (II – I), from following two regression. The difference 
between adjusted R2 is greater than the median of the sample the non-
financial firm is conservative and non-conservative otherwise 
 
     Eq (I):  LLPt = α0 +α1 NPL t-1 +  . 
     Eq (II): LLP t = α0 +α1 NPL t-1 + α2 NPL t + α3 NPL t+1 +  .  
 
  Where: 
LLPt denotes loan loss provision in quarter t divided by lagged total loans. 
 NPLt-1
  NPLt y  NPLt+1
 refer to past, current and future changes in 
nonperforming loans divided by lagged total loans.  
 
Bank_Size: Natural log of lagged total assets.  
Bank_Depta: Lagged total deposits divided by total loans.   
Bank- Firm Fixed Effects: Fixed effects for each bank-firm combination, aimed at 
controlling for unobservable, time invariant specific characteristics of banks, firms and 
the borrower-lender relationship.  
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Table 5. Effects of delay in loan loss recognition by banks prior to the crisis on 
the borrowers’ likelihood of bankruptcy 
This table reports estimation results of a logistic regression model whose dependent variable is 
BANKRUPT, a dummy variable which equals to one if non-financial firms fill for bankruptcy during the 
crisis and zero otherwise. The main independent variables are CAC, bank capital ratio and the interaction 
between both variables.  Control variables are included as arithmetic means for the period 1997-2009. 
Data comes from 147.471 firm - bank combinations for the period 1997 – 2009. The estimated standard 
errors are robust to heteroskedasticity and bank clustering effects. ***, ** and * denote statistical 
significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
Dep. var.: Bankrupt 
       Expected signs Coefficients p-value Sig. 
Z- Score (-) -0,7153 0,000 *** 
Relations 
 
0,2587 0,000 *** 
Consti (+) 0,0025 0,009 *** 
Firm_Size (-) -0,1720 0,000 *** 
CAC (-) -0,6455 0,000 *** 
Capital 
 
-1,2533 0,324 
 CAC x Capital (+) 6,9761 0,000 *** 
Bank_Depta 
 
0,2700 0,358 
 Bank_Loans 
 
1,2487 0,000 *** 
     INDUSTRY Dummies  YES 
Number of observations  147.741 
Adjusted R2 0,0981 
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Variable Definitions 
 
Bankrupt: An indicator variable equal to one if firm went bankrupt 
and zero otherwise. 
Z-Score:   Average Z-score for non-listed firms 
Relations:    Average bank relations. Bank Relations by firm. 
Consti:    Date of incorporation. 
Firm_Size:    Average of the natural log of total assets. 
CAC: CAC is an indicator variable equal to one for conservative 
banks and zero otherwise. 
Capital:   Average Capital Ratio.  
Bank_Depta:   Average of total deposits divided by total loans. 
Bank_Loans:   Average of total loans divided by total assets.  
Industry:   Industry Dummies.  
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Table 6. Banks´ Capital Ratio and the Spanish Credit Crunch 
Saving Banks vs. Commercial Banks 
 
This table reports estimation results of an OLS model for the increase in bank debt by borrowers. The main independent variables are the lenders’ capital ratios before and after 
the burst of the construction bubble. This regression model includes a set control variables at the bank, firm and bank-firm level. Data comes from 283.827 firm – commercial 
bank - year combinations and 98.850 firm – saving banks – year combinations for the period 1997 – 2009. The estimated standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity and 
bank-firm clustering effects. ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
Dep. var.:                                                     ∆ Loan 
           
    
Savings Banks
 
Commercial Banks  
             Expected signs   Coefficients p-value Sig.  Coefficients p-value Sig. 
Z- Score 
 
(+) 
 
0,0478 0,000 *** 
 
0,0422 0,000 *** 
Relations 
   
-0,0043 0,000 *** 
 
-0,002 0,000 *** 
Recession 
 
(-) 
 
0,0538 0,000 *** 
 
-0,0366 0,000 *** 
Capital 
   
-0,0768 0,137 
  
-0,0544 0,019 ** 
Capital x Recession 
 
(+) 
 
0,2894 0,000 *** 
 
0,03804 0,355 
 Bank_Size 
   
0,0056 0,015 ** 
 
0,0013 0,182 
 Bank_Depta 
 
(-) 
 
-0,0076 0,467 
  
-0,0107 0,037 ** 
           BANK – FIRM Dummies   YES YES 
Number of observations   
 
  98.850   283.827 
Adjusted R
2 
     0,0516   0,0521 
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Variable definition: 
  
  Loan:   Annual increase in loans divided by total assets. 
Z-score:   Altman Z-score for non-listed firms. 
Relations: Number of bank Relationships at the beginning of the 
year. 
Recession: An indicator variable equal to one for subsequent periods 
to 2007, and zero otherwise. 
Capital :   Capital Ratio at the beginning of the year, divided by 100. 
Bank_Size:   Natural log of lagged total assets. 
Bank_Depta:   Lagged total deposits divided by total loans. 
Bank- Firm Fixed Effects: Fixed effects for each bank-firm combination, which aim 
to control unobservable, constant and specific aspects. 
39 
 
TABLE 7. Delay of loan loss recognition by lenders before the crisis and increase in bank loans by borrowers during the crisis. 
Saving Banks vs. Commercial Banks. 
 
This table reports regression results of an OLS model for the increase in borrowers’ bank debt during the crisis. The main independent variables are the delay of loan loss recognition by banks 
before the crisis, a dichotomous variable, Recession, that equals one if year>2007 and zero otherwise, and the interaction between both variables. In addition, this regression model includes a 
set of control variables at bank, firm and bank - firm level. Data comes from 247.424 firm-commercial bank- year combinations and 95.264 firm–saving bank– year combinations for the period 
1997 - 2009. The estimated standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity and bank-firm clustering effects. ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
Dep. var.:   ∆ Loan 
           
    
Savings Banks 
 
Commercial Banks  
             Expected signs   Coefficients p-value Sig.  Coefficients p-value Sig. 
Z- Score 
 
(+) 
 
0,0478 0,000 *** 
 
0,0424 0,000 *** 
Relations 
   
-0,0043 0,000 *** 
 
-0,002 0,000 *** 
Recession 
 
(-) 
 
-0,0653 0,000 *** 
 
-0,0453 0,000 *** 
Capital 
   
-0,093 0,149 
  
-0,2451 0,000 *** 
Capital x Recession 
 
(+) 
 
0,5042 0,001 *** 
 
0,1875 0,283 
 CAC x Capital 
   
-0,1449 0,264 
  
0,2005 0,028 ** 
CAC x Recession 
 
(+) 
 
0,0026 0,835 
  
0,0329 0,007 *** 
CAC x Capital x Recession (-) 
 
-0,1569 0,385 
  
-0,6169 0,006 *** 
Bank_Size 
   
0,0054 0,019 ** 
 
0,0003 0,791 
 Bank_Depta 
 
(-) 
 
-0,0066 0,532 
  
-0,0101 0,171 
            BANK - FIRM Dummies   YES YES 
Number of observations       95.267   247.424 
Adjusted R       0,0518   0,0542 
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Variable Definitions 
  Loan: Annual increase in bank loans divided by total assets. 
Z-score:  Altman Z-score for non-listed firms. 
Relations: Number of bank Relationships.   
Recession:  An indicator variable equal to one for subsequent periods to 2007, and 
zero otherwise.  
Capital: Capital Ratio  
CAC:  An indicator variable equal to one for conservative banks and zero 
otherwise.  Where the conservatism measure is the difference between 
adjusted R2 (II – I), from following two regression. The difference 
between adjusted R2 is greater than the median of the sample the non-
financial firm is conservative and non-conservative otherwise 
 
     Eq (I):  LLPt = α0 +α1 NPL t-1 +  . 
     Eq (II): LLP t = α0 +α1 NPL t-1 + α2 NPL t + α3 NPL t+1 +  .  
  Where: 
LLPt denotes loan loss provision in quarter t divided by lagged total loans.  NPLt-1
 
 NPLt y  NPLt+1
 refer to past, current and future changes in nonperforming loans 
divided by lagged total loans.  
 
Bank_Size: Natural log of lagged total assets.  
Bank_Depta: Lagged total deposits divided by total loans.   
Bank- Firm Fixed Effects: Fixed effects for each bank-firm combination, aimed at 
controlling for unobservable, time invariant specific characteristics of banks, firms and 
the borrower-lender relationship.  
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TABLE 8. Effects of delay in loan loss recognition by banks prior to the crisis on the borrowers’ likelihood of bankruptcy 
Saving Banks vs. Commercial Banks 
 
This table reports estimation results of a logistic regression model whose dependent variable is BANKRUPT, a dummy variable which equals to one if non-financial firms fill for bankruptcy during 
the crisis and zero otherwise. The main independent variables are CAC, bank capital ratio and the interaction between both variables.  Control variables are included as arithmetic means for the 
period 1997-2009. Data comes from 98.441 firm–commercial bank combinations and 42.688 firm–saving bank combinations for the period 1997 – 2009.. The estimated standard errors are 
robust to heteroskedasticity and bank clustering effects. ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
 
Dep. var.:   BANKRUPT 
           
    
Savings Banks 
 
Commercial Banks  
               Expected signs   Coefficients p-value Sig.   Coefficients p-value Sig. 
Z- Score 
 
(-) 
 
-0,6560 0,000 *** 
 
-0,7478 0,000 *** 
Relations 
   
0,2667 0,000 *** 
 
0,2454 0,000 *** 
Consti  (+)  0,0045 0,057 **  0,0021 0,064 * 
Firm_Size 
 
(-) 
 
-0,1378 0,000 *** 
 
-0,1833 0,000 *** 
CAC                         (-)  -0,2775 0,234   -0,8913 0,000 *** 
Capital 
   
-1,4878 0,513 
  
-0,3268 0,384 
 CAC x Capital 
 
(+) 
 
0,2957 0,428 
  
10,7943 0,001 *** 
Bank_Loans 
   
1,4510 0,005 *** 
 
1,0721 0,001 *** 
Bank_Depta 
 
(-) 
 
-0,5728 0,246 
  
-0,0865 0,825 
 
           BANK - FIRM Dummies   YES YES 
INDUSTRIE Dummies    YES  YES 
Number of observations       42.688   98.441 
Adjusted R
2 
      0,0965   0,10 
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Variable Definitions 
 
Bankrupt: An indicator variable equal to one if firm went bankrupt 
and zero otherwise. 
Z-Score:   Average Z-score for non-listed firms 
Relations:    Average bank relations. Bank Relations by firm. 
Consti:    Date of incorporation. 
Firm_Size:    Average of the natural log of total assets. 
CAC: CAC is an indicator variable equal to one for conservative 
banks and zero otherwise. 
Capital:   Average Capital Ratio.  
Bank_Depta:   Average of total deposits divided by total loans. 
Bank_Loans:   Average of total loans divided by total assets.  
Industry:   Industry Dummies.  
 
 
 
 
